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This thesis evaluates the position of the NDP as Canada’s third party in federal electoral 
politics. It analyzes three external factors, the electoral system, the party finance system 
and the effects of voter behaviour and low voter turnout on the electoral success of the 
NDP.  This work aims to discover why the NDP is seemingly caught in what this thesis 
refers to as a third party curse. Each of the three external factors which are susceptible to 
change are analyzed individually to discover whether they have a negative effect on the 
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Fredrick Engelmann states that for many people the role of political parties in 
modern competitive politics is as dominant as the role a corporation plays in modern 
competitive economics.1 Most political scientists today agree that political parties are 
vital connectors between society and the processes of government, and that they are 
instrumental in providing the political system with accountable leadership. William 
Cross stated it well when he said, ‚Parties lie at the heart of Canadian democracy.‛2 To 
the general public, political parties are the most obvious feature of political life. 
Although they are most prominent during election periods, they play a continuous role 
in the political sphere acting as a bridge between society and government. A political 
party is a means by which a populace can identify and assess the ideals of individual 
candidates.  People use parties as symbols to which they can attach their allegiance and 
simplify the rules of politics.3 The main goals of a political party are usually to promote 
a certain set of ideas or beliefs, and to enjoy electoral success by attaining power within 
government. Electoral success is defined in this thesis as the ability of a party to 
consistently form government or Official Opposition.  
                                                 
1 Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz. Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. 
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967), 2 
2 William Cross. Political Parties. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 3 
3Richard J,  Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington. The Canadian Political System – Environment, Structure and 
Process – third edition.  (Toronto:  McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1981), 306 
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There are a few types of political parties in Canada. This thesis will refer to, a 
major party and a third party. A major party is a political party which has the electoral 
strength to form government with regularity and when defeated, usually constitutes the 
principal opposition to the party in power. There are two major parties in Canada, the 
Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada.  Throughout most of the 
twentieth century, Canada’s two major parties were the Progressive Conservative Party 
of Canada (PC) and the Liberal Party of Canada. While both parties tended to be 
ideologically diverse, the Conservatives settled on the right of center, while the Liberals 
found success to the left of center. These two parties have long dominated Canadian 
politics; if we regard today’s Conservative party as the successor of the old Progressive 
Conservative Party then the Liberals and the Conservatives have been the only two 
parties ever to form a federal government in Canada.  
A third party is a political party which does not normally have the electoral 
strength to form government or Official Opposition. It consistently runs candidates in 
all federal ridings and may play a significant role in minority governments. The party, 
with regularity, ranks third in electoral support and normally elects enough MPs to 
have official party status in the House of Commons, which is presently set at twelve 
seats. What really distinguishes a third party from a major party is not only their 
position in terms of votes or seats in elections, but also their institutional status within 
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the party system.4 Essentially, a third party is one that is not part of the ‚governing 
club‛ in that it is not considered a traditional governing alternative.5 It is also important 
to note, that a third party at the federal level is not necessarily a third party at the 
provincial level. 
The New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP) is a third party which runs 
candidates in all federal ridings, and regularly trails the two major parties in electoral 
support. The history of the party can be traced back to the 1930s when the democratic 
socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was formed. In 1958, the CCF 
formed an alliance with the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and became the NDP.6 
Upon creation of the new party, Tommy Douglas, CCF Premier of Saskatchewan, was 
elected the party’s first leader. While the NDP has fared better in elections than its 
predecessor, it still has not seen the level of success that was hoped for. By 1988, 
however, the party formed its largest caucus to date with 43 seats, before suffering a 
dramatic drop to eight seats in the 1993 election. In the 15 years since, the party has 
grown in support but consistently remained in third party status. The ideology of the 
party falls centre-left on the Canadian political spectrum, promoting social democratic 
theories. While it has never formed the federal government, it has wielded considerable 
                                                 
4 Eric Belanger ‚Third Party Success in Canada‛ in Canadian Parties in Transition¸eds. Alain-G. Gagnon and 
A. Brian Tanguay. (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2007), 83 
5 Belanger, 84 
6 Hugh G. Thorburn. ‚Parties in Canada‛ in Party Politics in Canada. 7th edition. Ed. Hugh Thorburn. 
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Ltd., 1996), 11  
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influence during times of minority governments. Today, the NDP remains the longest 
surviving third party in Canadian federal politics. 
With a consistent third party presence in Canadian federal politics, it is 
remarkable that such little scholarly work has focused on why such a party is seemingly 
caught in what the thesis will refer to as a ‚third party curse‛. A third party curse is a 
situation that arises when a third party cannot move forward to become a major party 
because of the impact of external factors such as electoral rules, financial arrangements 
or civic engagement. The NDP as Canada’s third party has run unsuccessfully, as 
defined above, in every federal election since the inception of its predecessor, the CCF, 
in 1933, yet has remained a consistent presence in Canadian federal politics. For the 
purposes of this paper, the Green Party of Canada will not be considered a third party 
as it does not have representation in the House. 
This research is significant in evaluating the future of party politics in Canada. 
Will the Liberals and Conservatives continue to be the dominating parties? Or is it 
possible for a third party to break through the two-party domination of Canadian 
politics? This thesis will provide an important foundation for answering these questions. 
Why have third parties been so unsuccessful in Canadian federal electoral politics? Do 
external factors inhibit the ability of a third party to become a governing party or 
Official Opposition in Canadian federal politics? In order to answer these questions, the 
thesis will examine the case of the New Democratic Party. The NDP is Canada’s longest 
5 
 
surviving third party in federal politics and has never formed the government or 
Official Opposition. It consistently ranks third in electoral support as well as seats won 
among parties competing in the majority of federal constituencies.  
There may be an array of reasons why a political party fails to become 
‚successful.‛  These reasons may be either internal or external. Among the internal 
factors (which, by definition, are under control of the party and its members) are such 
things as its platform, its electoral strategies and its leader and candidates. There are 
also external factors, some of which are shaped by legislation or the actions of 
individual electors. This thesis will examine three such external factors, each of which 
has been shaped by contemporary ‚political choices‛ and each of which appears to be 
susceptible to change: 
 the Single Member Plurality electoral system – which has operated almost by 
default since before Confederation but has been subject to scrutiny in recent 
years; 
 the party financing provisions of the Canada Elections Act – which have only been 
in operation since 1974 but have lately been amended significantly; and 
 the trend towards lower voter turnout – which has been widely viewed as 
deplorable but not necessarily permanent. 
 
The Canadian Electoral System 
The first factor to be discussed is the Canadian electoral system. The Canadian 
government is based on a parliamentary system of government; the federal Parliament 
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consists of the sovereign (represented by the Governor General), an upper house 
(Senate) and the lower house (House of Commons). Canada has a first-past-the-post 
electoral system where the candidate with the most votes wins – therefore an absolute 
majority is not needed in order to win an electoral district. Candidates can run for 
election in one riding only, either under a party label or as an independent with no 
party affiliation. Put simplistically, after the election, the party that has elected the most 
representatives because it won the most ridings normally serves as the governing party 
and the leader of the party becomes the Prime Minister. The party that has elected the 
second largest number of representatives serves as the Official Opposition. All elected 
candidates, both from the governing party and opposition, and other parties or 
independents, have a seat in the House of Commons where they vote on legislation and 
more.  
The current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system has invariably contributed to the 
third party curse which has trapped the NDP in third party status because it favours a 
two party system through disproportionately distributing seats in the House of 
Commons in favour of the governing party. The most obvious inhibiting feature is 
purely statistical. A third party simply cannot gain legislative power if its support is too 
concentrated, as it will not be able to elect enough candidates to Parliament. On the 
other hand, if the support for the political party is too geographically scattered then it 
will also have trouble winning seats, as it will not have enough support in a 
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concentrated area to elect even a single candidate.  As an alternative, the electoral laws 
in a country that uses a proportional representation system discourage a two-party 
system: the number of votes received determines the number of seats won. Therefore, 
new or smaller parties can develop an immediate electoral role, by gaining seats in the 
House. Maurice Duverger argued that the use of a proportional representation system 
would make a two party system less likely, making this type of system more favourable 
for a third party. Douglas Rae also noted that most electoral systems act as ‘brakes’ on 
the fractionalization of party systems by favouring a few strong parties at the expense of 
many weaker ones.7 And much like Duverger suggests, Douglas Rae argues that there 
are no electoral systems that positively accelerate the development of small parties but 
some are weaker brakes against their development than others, therefore creating a more 
favourable scenario for a third party.  
It is clear that the negative effects of the FPTP system are not universal to all 
electoral systems as a system of proportional representation would eliminate an 
enormous barrier to third party success in Canada. It would end the continual under 
representation of the third party. Chapter Two will demonstrate how the current first-
past-the-post system negatively affects a third party from achieving fair representation 
in the House of Commons. It will also discuss how strategic voting as a result of the 
first-past-the-post system has cost the NDP electoral support, and how strategic 
                                                 




behaviour is dependent on the electoral system and declines as the proportionality of 
the electoral system increases, thereby lessening the negative consequences suffered by 
a third party.   
The Canadian Party Finance System 
 The next factor to be addressed is the party finance system. The financing 
provisions of the Canada Elections Act also hamper the electoral success of the third party 
by favouring the two major parties. It is important for political parties to receive 
financial contributions from the state in order to prevent dependence on private donors 
and to guarantee a degree of financial equity between political parties. While reforms 
brought about through the Canada Elections Act in 1974 and Bill C-24 in 2003 have made 
significant contributions to the regulation of political dollars, there remains a bias in 
these provisions in favour of pre-existing major parties. For example, the quarterly 
allowance provided to parties based on the number of votes received in the previous 
election is a clear example of a bias in favour of the major parties as they are sure to 
have received the most votes, thereby receiving the most in public dollars. Furthermore, 
these subsidies were created as a measure to replace the funds that were to be lost as a 
result of the ban on corporate and union donations. However, the switch from corporate 
and union donations to public subsides has resulted in a much larger monetary gain for 
the two major parties. Chapter Three will address these issues as well as others and 
evaluate their impact on the third party curse.  
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Voter Behaviour and Voter Turnout in Canada 
 The final factor to be addressed is the trend towards lower voter turnout. For 
many Canadians, voting is the only form of political expression. So, when voter turnout 
begins to hit all time lows, it should become worrisome to the health of a properly 
functioning democracy. Additionally, what a lack of electoral participation means for 
governmental representation should be of great concern.  
Voter apathy and low voter turnout are not problems that affect only third 
parties – in fact they affect every candidate and political party running in the election. 
However, the problem of low voter turnout is very unlikely to be uniform across major 
social categories.8  Rather, the drop is almost certain to be accompanied by an enhanced 
degree of inequality between the ‚haves‛ and the ‚have-nots‛. This decline is most 
particularly expected among groups including young people, immigrants, tenants and 
the poor - groups that are already considered to be participating at lower levels relative 
to those who are both socially and economically better off. This unevenness in electoral 
participation usually translates into distortions in representation. Chapter Four will 
show that these groups are also a strong base of support for the NDP, and that the low 
turnout rate from these groups negatively affects the electoral success of the party. The 
chapter will show that in countries where turnout is high, the link between 
socioeconomic status and turnout tends to be less strong, suggesting the demographics 
                                                 
8 CRIC, 29 
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of the voting population are similar to those of the general population. Since non-voters 
believe the government is unresponsive to their needs, and governments have little 
reason to respond to the concerns of non-voters, a vicious cycle presents itself where 
government response, or a lack thereof, further reinforces the belief among non-voters 
that governments do not care about the issues concerning them. It will demonstrate that 
the lack of civic engagement from the young has contributed to the effect of low turnout 
on the third party curse.  
  The thesis will analyze the impact of these three external factors on the success of 
the NDP in contemporary Canadian national politics. Whether a third party will see 
success following reconciliation of these factors is another question. The research will 
focus not on whether these factors are sufficiently responsible for the lack of third party 
success in Canada, but on whether they have inhibited the ability of a third party to 
achieve electoral success by contributing to the third party curse. The body of the thesis 
will be organized into three parts, with each external factor evaluated independently of 
the others. Once all three factors have been discussed, a summary and review of the 
findings will follow in the conclusion, including a discussion on the significance and 
implications of the findings of this research.  
*** 
 The New Democratic Party of Canada has been a consistent presence in Canadian 
politics since its predecessor’s (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) inception in 
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the 1930s. As the strongest third party in the federal sphere, the NDP has never come 
close to forming government. The following will show how the three factors briefly 
outlined above combine to create a ‚third party curse‛ which inhibits the ability of the 
party to gain power. Resolving the negative consequences brought about by these 
factors may not achieve the sufficient conditions for third party success in Canada. 
However, this thesis will argue that they inhibit the ability of a third party to break 
through the two party dominance of Canadian national politics.  
 It is important to reiterate that it is not the intention of this thesis to argue that 
these factors are the sole reasons why the NDP has never formed government at the 
federal level in Canada. Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate that there are external 
factors that prevent a third party in Canada from achieving electoral success. It is 
possible that the reform of these barriers alone will not lead to the NDP forming 
government. However, the reformation of these factors will be necessary if a third party 
is ever to see electoral success in Canada; however, whether or not they are sufficient 










The Canadian Electoral System 
 
Since its first federal election in 1867, Canada has used the first-past-the-post 
electoral system inherited from Great Britain. However, over the past two centuries 
Canada’s political, cultural and social reality has changed enormously, and the first-
past-the-post system in today’s society does not meet the diverse needs of Canadians, 
many of whom demand an electoral system which better reflects the society in which we 
live. If the electoral system is a contributing factor to the third party curse, one would 
expect to see an inherent bias in the system towards major parties and against a third 
party. One would expect to see this bias present today, as well as in previous elections, 
since Confederation in 1867. This chapter will show how the first-past-the-post system 
has discriminated against the NDP in Canada through disproportionate electoral results 
and invariably traps the party into the third party curse.  
An electoral system that offers a fair playing field for all parties and does not 
favour a two party system would be beneficial for the multi-party political atmosphere 
in Canada. The current first-past-the-post system discriminates against third parties by 
encouraging or favouring a two-party system through disproportionately distributing 
seats in the House of Commons, usually in favour of the governing party. It is important 
to look at what the results in the House would be under a system of proportional 
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representation in order to truly understand how constraining the electoral rules of our 
current system are. The consequences of the disproportions created by the first-past-the-
post system contribute to the third party curse in which the NDP is trapped.  
Maurice Duverger observed a tendency in the 1950s and 1960s now referred to as 
Duverger’s Law. Duverger’s Law asserts that an election system of plurality rule, also 
referred to as first-past-the-post, whereby a candidate wins through a plurality of votes 
rather than a majority, tends to favour a two party system.9 Duverger also said that both 
‚the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour 
multi-partyism‛.10 Duverger’s thoughts were that elections determined by a majority 
vote on only one ballot would ‚pulverize third parties‛.11 Duverger’s Law also applies 
to Canadian elections since the party that receives the plurality of votes, on a single 
ballot, as opposed to a second ballot or run off ballot, usually forms government.12 
According to Duverger, third parties are going to be permanent doormats in any 
plurality system as it will typically favour two party politics. Furthermore, even when 
the system functions with only two parties, the one that wins is favoured through 
overrepresentation since the proportion of seats that it receives is more than the 
percentage of votes received. On the other hand, the party that finishes second will 
suffer under-representation, as the proportion of seats it wins is smaller than the 
                                                 
9 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. (New York: Wiley, 1964) 
10 Duverger (1964), 239  
11 Maurice Duverger, ‚Factors in a Two-party and Multiparty system‛ Party Politics and Pressure Groups 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), 23 
12 Exceptions to this occurred 9 times in the 40 general elections since 1867: 1878, 1882, 1887, 1891, 1896, 
1926, 1957, 1962 and 1979 
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percentage of votes received.13 Where there is a third party, this gap between seats won 
and percentage of vote is usually quite large and the third party is usually more greatly 
underrepresented than the second party is, by suffering an even greater 
disproportionate vote-to-seat ratio. Duverger presents the scenario of an electoral 
district where there are 100,000 voters with moderate views, and 80,000 communist 
voters.14 If the 100,000 moderate voters are divided into two parties, there is a good 
chance that the communist candidate may win the election if one of the moderate 
opponents receive more than 20,000 votes, thereby leaving the other with less than 
80,000, which is a smaller number than that of the communist voters. Duverger argues 
that in the following election, if the two moderate parties do not unite, one will 
gradually be eliminated in a process of under-representation, in an effort to ensure the 
communist candidate does not win.15 In Canada, the NDP has not united with the 
Liberals as per Duverger’s hypothesis; however, it has also not been eliminated, yet. So, 
is the NDP an anomaly to Duverger’s Law or is the party headed down the path of 
extinction?   
Essentially, the role of the electoral system as Duverger saw it is to act as an 
accelerator or a brake.  
An election by a majority vote on a single ballot has a dual 
effect: first, it poses an obstacle to the appearance of a new 
party, although this obstacle is not insurmountable (the role of 
                                                 
13 Duverger (1972), 23 
14 Duverger, (1972), 22 
15 Duverger, (1972), 23 
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the brake); secondly, it tends to eliminate the weakest party (or 
parties) if there are more than two (the role of the accelerator).16 
 
This is similar to the scenario that presents itself in Canada. The FPTP system has made 
it very difficult, albeit not impossible, for new parties to emerge (the role of the brake), 
and while the NDP, the weakest party of the three main parties, has not been eliminated 
it has been held back from experiencing greater electoral success (the role of the 
accelerator).  
In 1967, Douglas Rae reached much the same conclusions that Duverger had a 
decade earlier regarding the effects of electoral systems: 
The statesman who must choose between electoral laws 
confronts a dilemma. On the one hand he may opt for highly 
proportional election outcomes, in which case he is likely to 
encourage the fractionalization of party systems over time. Or, 
on the other hand, he may opt to encourage the development 
and maintenance of two parties, or less fractionalized multi-
party competition, with the price being less proportional 
outcomes.17 
 
Duverger asserted that a system of proportional representation plays the opposite role 
of a FPTP system and does not slow down the development of new parties (which a 
plurality electoral system does). Duverger articulated the effects of the electoral system 
in the formulation of three electoral laws: (1) a majority vote on one ballot is conducive 
to a two party system; (2) proportional representation is conducive to a multiparty 
                                                 
16 Duverger (1972), 25 




system; (3) a majority vote on two ballots is conducive to a multiparty system, inclined 
toward forming coalitions.18 He argued that the single member plurality system 
accentuated the geographical localization of opinions: one 
might even say that it tends to transform a national opinion< 
into a local opinion by allowing it to be represented only in the 
sections of the country in which it is the strongest 
 
while in a system of proportional representation 
 
opinions strongly entrenched locally tend to be broadened on 
the national plane by the possibility of being represented in 
districts where they are in a small minority19 
 
A PR electoral system encourages minority nationalist agendas by lowering the barriers 
to representation for small parties that may represent minority views by granting many 
of these parties a decisive role in the formation of government. The ability of a 
proportional representation system to deliver seats to those outside the major parties 
promises representation of a wider spectrum of public opinion and lowers some of the 
barriers that prevent third parties from achieving electoral success. A system of 
proportional representation would reduce the likelihood of the NDP remaining in the 
third party curse. This means that the electoral system currently in use does affect the 
success of a third party by making it suffer the negative consequences associated with a 
system which favours two party dominance.  
                                                 
18 Duverger (1972), 23 
19 Duverger (1964), 383 
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In an article written in 1968, Alan Cairns documented many of the distortions 
that the Canadian electoral system has produced over the period from 1921 to 1965 and 
argued that the cumulative effects of these on political parties and representation in 
Canada were very serious.20 
The electoral system has made a major contribution to the 
identification of particular sections/provinces with particular 
parties. It has under-valued the partisan diversity within each 
section/province. By doing so it has rendered the parliamentary 
composition of each party less representative of the sectional 
interests in the political system than is the party electorate from 
which that representation is derived. 21 
These distortions have continued beyond 1965 into present day Canada. In 1993, the 
Bloc Quebecois, a regional party which nominates candidates in only one province, 
formed the Official Opposition with only the fourth highest share of the popular vote. In 
2004, the NDP received 15.7% of the popular vote, but received only 19 seats (or 6.2%) of 
the seats in the House. Yet, the Bloc, with only 12.4% of the vote received 54 seats, or 
17.5% of the seats.  In 2008, the Green Party of Canada received more than 900,000 votes 
across the country, yet did not win a single seat in Parliament. These examples show 
that the distortions are still present in Canada today, and demonstrate how the system 
continues to work against third parties and those with wide national support such as the 
NDP.  
                                                 
20 Alain C. Cairns, ‚The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965‛ Canadian Journal of 
Political Science. (Vol. 1, No. 1 March 1968) 
21 Cairns, 62  
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It is rare that the percentage of seats a party receives in the current Canadian 
electoral system is equivalent to the percentage of votes received. This distorted 
conversion results in a configuration of parties in Parliament that inaccurately reflects 
their level of voter support, and thus that the FPTP system does not accurately reflect 
the preferences of the Canadian electorate. The NDP is the party that most often suffers 
from the ill effects of this electoral system. The percentage of seats the NDP received in 
the House, in almost every election, has been less than its entitlement based on the 
percentage of the popular vote it received. As a consequence, if voters see that the NDP 
is not increasing in electoral support, it may result in the view that the party is not a 
viable contender, making them less likely to vote NDP. The perceptions created and 
perpetuated by the electoral system as well its statistical consequences may also have an 
affect on electoral results.  
Cairns’ major assertion is that the electoral system generates greater 
disproportions in legislative seats than is warranted by the social divisions in the 
country. Cairns never denied that social cleavages were unlikely to create a multiparty 
system in Canada irrespective of the electoral system in use, but his claim was that the 
electoral system exaggerates rather than moderates the impact of the cleavages. Likewise, 
while it is not possible to predict what results the NDP would yield without the 
influence of the first-past-the-post system, the claim is that the system exaggerates 
rather than moderates the impact of social cleavages. One of Cairns most controversial 
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claims was that the electoral system discourages parties from being nationalizing forces 
because of the electoral rewards to be reaped from concentrated support. Cairns asserts 
that this punishes national third parties that are not regionally concentrated. The NDP is 
such a party, as its support is widely distributed across the country, unlike the 
concentrated support of the Bloc Quebecois (Table 2.1). Cairns’ theory further explains 
how the electoral system affects the third party curse. The support of the NDP as 
demonstrated in Table 2.1 is widely concentrated and the first-past-the-post system 
punishes the party for it.  
Table 2.1: 2006 Canadian Federal Election NDP vote share by province  
 NDP Vote Percentage Bloc Vote Percentage 
Nfld 13.6 0 
PEI 9.6 0 
N.S. 29.9 0 
N.B. 21.9 0 
Que. 7.5 42.1 
Ont. 19.4 0 
Man. 25.4 0 
Sask. 24.1 0 
Alb. 11.7 0 
B.C 28.5 0 
Y.T. 23.9 0 
N.W.T. 42.2 0 
Nun. 17.2 0 
National 17.5 10.5 
Source: Elections Canada. Thirty-ninth General Election 2006: Official Voting Results 
 
 
Each Canadian is afforded only one vote, and ideally that vote is given to the 
candidate or party which best represents his or her principles, values, and ideal policies 
so that those views may be represented within Parliament. However, the current 
20 
 
electoral system encourages citizens to vote strategically in elections to the dismay of a 
third party. This happens as a result of the consequences of electoral rules. These rules 
are constraining devices that, by encouraging strategic behaviour among voters, ‚force 
the coordination of resources and ballots on a reduced set of candidates.‛22 Rational 
voters will avoid voting for candidates they expect will fare poorly, even if that means 
supporting a second-choice candidate. Over time, as a result of strategic behaviour, 
‚weak‛ candidates get ‚weeded‛ out or seen as a ‚wasted voted‛, resulting in only a 
certain number of seemingly ‚viable‛ candidates on the ballot. Essentially, in a first-
past-the-post election, voters may vote for a candidate that they believe has a greater 
chance of winning over a candidate that they actually prefer. Third parties are most 
likely to suffer from this phenomenon, as they are viewed as less likely to ‚win‛ over a 
major party.  
The process of strategic voting works in such a way that, for example, a left wing 
voter who may wish to vote for the NDP may instead vote for a popular moderate 
candidate, such as a Liberal, in an attempt to help defeat the right-wing candidate, the 
Conservative. This is exactly the phenomenon that Duverger’s Law suggests results in 
the first-past-the-post system leading to a two-party system.  Cox, in 1997, however, 
provided empirical evidence that strategic voting diminishes substantially in large (3 or 
                                                 
22 Charles Boix, ‚Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced 
Democracies‛ The American Political Science Review (Vol. 93, No.3: Sept. 1993), 610 
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4 more seats) districts,23 often found in proportional representation systems. Therefore, 
strategic voting declines as the proportionality of the electoral system increases.24 Thus, 
the implementation of a proportional representation system which results in a more 
accurate vote-to-seat ratio will lead to fewer votes lost for the NDP as a consequence of 
strategic voting.  Due to the fact that seats can be gained with only a fraction of the total 
vote (since votes across the country will be considered together, rather than just votes 
placed in concentrated areas) voters have fewer incentives to abandon their preferred 
candidate for one they perceive has a greater likelihood of winning under a FPTP 
system where only votes placed in concentrated areas are counted towards a single 
candidate. This is important because it shows that a system of proportional 
representation does not have the same debilitating affects on a third party as the FPTP 
system does, thereby further supporting the claim that the contribution of the electoral 
system on the third party curse will be less likely under a more proportionate electoral 
system. 
 In the first-past-the-post system, unless one has voted for the winning candidate 
in his or her riding, one’s vote is essentially ‘wasted’ in that the vote is not sitting in 
Parliament. In other words, those votes do not directly determine seat distribution. 
Likewise, votes are also wasted when they are in excess of the number required to win 
the particular riding. The MMP system, a system of PR advocated by the Law 
                                                 
23 Gary W. Cox, ‚Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties‛ American Journal of 
Political Science. (Vol. 14, No.1  January1997) 
24 Boix, 610  
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Commission of Canada25 would effectively reduce the quantity of wasted votes by the 
use of a party list system where parties do not have to win a particular riding in order to 
gain representation in Parliament. As Cox’s study shows, this will decrease the 
likelihood of strategic voting, and as a result the vote percentage of the NDP will 
increase.  
Table 2.2 shows the results of the three main parties for all federal elections since 
the CCF’s first election in 1935 and the staggering disproportions that have existed as a 
direct result of the first-past-the-post system. These results show the negative affect the 
electoral system has on a third party. The CCF/NDP has consistently received a 
percentage of seats lower than its percentage of the popular vote.  Of the twenty-three 
elections held between the years of 1935 and 2008, the Liberals have received a lower 
proportion of seats than votes on only five occasions – 1957, 1958, 1984, 1988 and 2008– 
all periods of Tory rule. Likewise, the Conservatives have suffered from this 
phenomenon only nine times – 1935, 1940, 1945, 1949, 1953, 1968, 1993, 1997 and 2000 – 
all periods of Liberal rule. The CCF/NDP has suffered from this phenomenon each of 
the twenty three elections with the exception of 1962 when the party came within 0.4% 
of vote-to-seat parity with 11.7% of the vote and 11.3% of the seats. The most significant 
difference was in 2004 when the NDP received 15.7% of the popular vote, but only 6.2% 
of the seats, a total of 19. If the 15.7% of the vote the party received was converted into 
15.7% of the seats in the House of Commons, then the NDP would have had roughly 48  
                                                 
25 The Law Commission of Canada. Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada, 2004 
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Table 2.2: Popular vote percentages and seat percentages during the general federal 





















1935 29.80% 15.90% 44.40% 69.80% 8.90% 2.90% 
1940 30.41% 15.91% 51.32% 73.06% 8.42% 3.27% 
1945 27.70% 27.30% 41.40% 51.00% 15.70% 11.40% 
1949 29.70% 15.60% 50.10% 72.50% 13.40% 5.00% 
1953 31.00% 19.20% 50.00% 64.50% 11.30% 8.70% 
1957 39.00% 42.30% 42.30% 39.60% 10.80% 9.40% 
1958 53.70% 78.50% 33.80% 18.50% 9.50% 3.00% 
1962 37.30% 43.80% 37.40% 37.40% 11.70% 11.30% 
1963 32.90% 35.90% 41.70% 48.70% 13.10% 6.40% 
1965 32.10% 36.60% 39.80% 49.40% 17.70% 7.90% 
1968 31.40% 27.30% 45.50% 58.70% 17.00% 8.30% 
1972 35.00% 40.50% 38.50% 41.30% 17.70% 11.70% 
1974 35.40% 36.00% 43.20% 53.40% 15.40% 6.10% 
1979 35.90% 48.20% 40.10% 40.40% 17.90% 9.20% 
1980 44.30% 52.10% 32.50% 36.50% 19.80% 11.30% 
1984 50.00% 74.80% 28.00% 14.20% 18.80% 10.60% 
1988 43.00% 57.30% 31.90% 28.10% 20.40% 14.60% 
1993 16.00% 0.70% 41.30% 60.00% 6.90% 3.10% 
1997 18.80% 6.60% 38.50% 51.50% 11.00% 7.00% 
2000 12.20% 4.00% 40.80% 57.10% 8.50% 4.30% 
2004 29.60% 32.10% 36.70% 43.80% 15.70% 6.20% 
2006 36.30% 40.30% 30.20% 33.40% 17.50% 9.40% 
2008 37.63% 46.4% 26.22% 25.00% 18.13% 12.00% 
 
* This also includes the former Progressive Conservative Party (PC), as well as the National 
Government – the name the Conservatives ran under during the 1940 general federal election. 
**This also includes the former Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF)  
 
Source: Parliament of Canada 





seats in a 308 seat House, resulting in a much different balance of power in the minority 
Parliament resulting from that election. Seat distribution would have been similar to 
that shown below in Table 2.3.  The House would have had a smaller Liberal minority 
government, with a smaller Conservative Opposition and a larger NDP caucus resulting 
in the party having greater influence than they actually did. This data makes it clear that 
the first-past-the-post system electoral system consistently punishes a third party 
making it difficult to break through the dominance of the two major parties in Canada. 
The continual under-representation of the NDP also reinforces the idea that a vote for 
the party is a wasted vote as voters may view the party as having little influence in 
government, thereby creating a vicious cycle that contributes to the position of the party 
in third party curse.  






Percentage of Popular Vote 36.7% 29.6% 15.7% 12.4% 
Actual Seat Numbers 135 99 19 54 
Proportionate Seat 
Numbers 
113 91 48 38 
Source: Elections Canada. Thirty-eighth General Election 2004: Official Voting Results 
 
 
It is important to look at the results a proportional representation system could 
produce to compare to the actual results produced in a first-past-the-post system. By 
doing so, the dramatic disproportions that have occurred under the FPTP system are not 
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only revealed but the much fairer, proportionate, and accurate results that could be 
achieved under a system of proportional representation are demonstrated. The results of 
what could occur under a system of proportional representation demonstrate that the 
disproportions under the current electoral system are not necessary consequences of any 
electoral system. This shows that the current electoral system plays a significant role in 
the third party curse as the negative consequences it results in for the NDP can be 
eliminated under a more proportional electoral system.  
Table 2.3 shows that the 2004 election resulted in both the major parties being 
overrepresented as well as the regionally based Bloc; the NDP on the other hand was 
severely underrepresented. Under a system of proportional representation, the 
composition of the House would have been dramatically different. Table 2.4 below 
shows the dramatic disproportions that the regionally based Bloc has benefited from as 
a result of the first-past-the-post system. The electoral system overcompensating 
regional parties works negatively toward the NDP as a national third party. While the 
Bloc receives more and more seats than its actual votes would warrant, a third party, 
such as the NDP, due to the FPTP system, receives less than it is entitled to.  By 
favouring major and concentrated parties the electoral system increases the likelihood of 






Table 2.4: Federal Election Results for the Bloc Quebecois 1993-2006  
 Percentage of Popular Vote Percentage of Seats 
1993 13.5% 18.3% 
1997 10.7% 14.6% 
2000 10.7% 12.6% 
2004 12.4% 17.5% 
2006 10.5% 16.6% 
Source: Elections Canada. Thirty-fifth – thirty-ninth General Election 1993-2006. Official Voting 
Results 
 
This startling record of disproportions confirms that the electoral system plays a 
negative role in the electoral success of the NDP. A disproportionate legislative result in 
the House is not a one time phenomenon; these disproportions occur frequently and 
consistently, disadvantaging the NDP far more than the other parties, preventing the 
party from seeing greater levels of electoral success and ensuring it remains in third 
party status.   
In 1993, the FPTP system handed the Bloc the title of Official Opposition, despite 
the fact it received only the forth-highest share of the popular vote. However, had the 
seats been distributed proportionally, we would have seen a very different makeup of 
Parliament. The results of the 1993 election are shown below in Table 2.5. Under a 
system of proportional representation, assuming the same popular vote percentages, the 
Reform party would have formed the Official Opposition not the Bloc. The PCs, 
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receiving the second highest percentage of votes, were grossly underrepresented (right 
in tune with Duverger’s theory of the second party discussed earlier) and the NDP once 
again received fewer seats than was warranted by the number of votes received. If seats 
had been distributed proportionately according to vote, the Liberals would have 
received 55 seats less than they did, and the NDP would have received 11 seats more. 
There is no doubt that many parties have suffered at one point or another by the first-
past-the-post system but it is also apparent that the NDP has suffered the greatest 
consistent under-representation. Therefore it seems the electoral system is a contributing 
factor to the third party curse as it negatively affects the electoral success of the NDP to 
a greater degree and more consistently than the major parties.    
Table 2.5: 1993 Federal Election Results 
 Liberal Reform Progressive 
Conservatives 




41.3% 18.7% 16.0% 13.5% 6.9% 3.6% 
Percentage 
of Seats  




177 52 2 54 29 1 
Source: Elections Canada. Thirty-fifth General Election 1993: Official Voting Results 
By looking at what could occur under a system of proportional representation, it 
is clear that more proportionate electoral results are possible, and that the negative 
effects of the current electoral system on the NDP can be changed. The startling record 
of disproportions produced by the first-past-the-post system in relation to the popular 
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support of the NDP has made the electoral system a contributing factor to why the party 
is caught in a third party curse. The enormous disproportions in vote-to-seat ratio have 
negatively affected the NDP while at the same time awarded other parties more seats 
than warranted by their actual vote percentages.   
In 1912, Joseph Barthélemy, a Belgian politician, predicted that the day would 
come where proportional representation would become as widespread and 
unchallenged as universal suffrage.26 While many democracies around the world have 
realized PR is a more effective system, Canada has yet to adopt the system, and until it 
does, the NDP as Canada’s third party, will remain trapped in the curse suffering 
inaccurate and disproportional electoral results.  The implementation of a proportional 
representation system in Canada would mean that an existing third party whose 
electoral support is widely spread would no longer be disadvantaged compared with 
parties whose electoral support is equivalent in size, but concentrated in specific areas. 
Under the current system a third party must face enormous challenges while trying to 
convert its popular support into a proportionate number of seats. This hurdle is 
electorally unfair and biased towards third parties and plays a key role in the lack of 
electoral success achieved by the NDP.  As long as elections continue to be run under 
the first-past-the-post system, the NDP will remain the third party in Canada, trapped 
indefinitely in the third party curse.  
                                                 
26 André Blais and Louise Massicotte ‚Electoral Systems‛ in Comparing Democracies 2 – New Challenges in the 




 The Canadian Party Finance System 
 
Public financing is crucial for the ability of the NDP to compete in election 
campaigns without a significant financial disadvantage compared to the major parties. 
In 1974, the Canadian government made a significant effort to enact regulatory 
measures of the party finance system with the Elections Expenses Act of 1974, a series of 
amendments to the Canada Elections Act which focused primarily on party spending. The 
next major change was made in 2003, with Bill C-24, an act to amend the Canada Elections 
Act and Income Tax Act.  If the Canadian party finance system plays a role in explaining 
the third party curse, one would expect to see the finance provisions in the finance 
system working in favour of the major parties. When the new amendments were 
introduced in 2003 one would expect to see that they further disadvantaged a third 
party or provided it the least benefit among the three main parties in Canada. The 
disparity in funds that exists between the political parties in Canada places a third party 
in a disadvantageous position. This happens because the public subsidies put in place 
with Bill C-24 will always favour the major parties, making it impossible for a third 
party to ever reach parity with the others. 
Bill C-24 effectively banned donations to political parties from corporations and 
unions with few exceptions. Corporations and trade unions under this legislation are 
prohibited from making financial donations to both political parties and leadership 
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contests.27 However, they may still contribute an annual maximum of one thousand 
dollars to candidates, electoral district associations and nomination contestants. Bill C-2, 
the Federal Accountability Act, which took effect on January 1st, 2007, went one step 
further by eliminating any financial contributions from corporations and trade unions.28 
In order to make up for the shortfall in party revenues lost from the ban on corporate 
and union donations additional public funding provisions were instituted to create 
subsidies for the federal parties. 
Bill C-24 provides parties with an annual allowance based on the number of 
votes they received in the last election. In order to qualify for this allowance, parties 
need to have received either 2% of the vote nationally or 5% of the votes in the ridings 
where the party ran candidates. Parties that qualify will receive $1.75 for each vote they 
receive in a quarterly allowance.29 This, however, heavily favours the governing party 
and major parties as they are certain to have received the most votes in the previous 
election. As a result, the Conservatives and Liberals will always receive more public 
funding than the NDP. This situation puts the two major parties in a more favourable 
position than a third party and also affects the ability of a third party to communicate 
their interests to the general public as a result of funding inequalities.  
 
 
                                                 
27 Bill C-24 An Act to Amend Canada’s Election Act and Income Tax Act.  
28 Bill C-2 Federal Accountability Act. 
29 The $1.75 allowance is subject to inflation 
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Table 3.1: Public Subsidies three years since Bill C-24, and corporate and union 
donations three years prior to Bill C-24 
 NDP Liberals Conservatives 
Corporation and Union donations 
in the last three years before Bill 
C-24 (2001 - 2003) 
$7.89 million $23.42 
million 
$10.34 million 
Public Subsidies in the first three 
years since Bill C-24 (2004 - 2006)  
$11.38 million $26.8 million $24.63 million 
Source: Elections Canada 
 
The introduction of public subsidies clearly improved the financial position of all 
three parties. However, the replacement of the reliance on corporate and union 
donations with public subsidies left the Conservatives with a significant financial 
advantage over both the NDP and the Liberals.  As Table 3.1 shows the NDP received 
only $11.38 million in public subsidies while both the Liberals and Conservatives 
received more than $20 million. It created a scenario that offered more money to all 
three political parties than the funding received through corporate and union donations; 
however, the amount of funding received by the major parties is significantly greater 
than that received by the third party. The funding will always reward parties that 
receive the most electoral support thereby disadvantaging a third party by punishing it 
for the very thing that makes it a third party. This furthers the inequity between the 
parties placing the third party in unfavourable circumstances thereby contributing to the 
third party curse.  
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In the 2006 general election, the Conservative party received 5,374,071 votes 
awarding them approximately $9,404,624. 2530, the Liberals received 4,479,415 votes 
awarding them approximately $7,838,976.2531 while the NDP with 2,589,697 votes 
received only approximately $4,531,794.7532 of this public funding, less than half of what 
the Conservatives received.33 While the Conservatives received more votes and by the 
very nature of the public subsidies formula should receive more funding, it is the 
formula itself which creates the problem. Public subsidies are essential to any finance 
system however a formula based on rewarding past electoral performance is sure to 
function in favour of the major parties. While this funding reliably ensures that the 
parties will receive a sum of public funding, it continues to be unfavourable for the NDP 
as a third party. While the party receives predictable amounts of public dollars, both the 
Liberals and Conservatives will always receive more, therefore contributing to the third 
party curse as it makes it difficult for a third party to compete on the same level as the 
major parties.  
The new system of public financing, because it is based largely on past electoral 
performance, could have an effect on the composition and character of the party. Young 
et al argue that expectations about the effects of public financing vary from those who 
                                                 
30Figure derived at without consideration of the cost of inflation. Conservative financial records filed with 
Elections Canada show $14, 734, 893 received in government transfers for the calendar year of 2006. 
31 Liberal financial records filed with Elections Canada show $8, 572, 966 received in government allowance 
for the calendar year of 2006  
32 NDP financial records filed with Elections Canada show $4, 661, 269 received in transfers and 
government allowances for the calendar year of 2006. 
33 Elections Canada. Official Voting Results – 39th General Election.  
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anticipate the system will entrench the governing parties’ advantage to others who 
expect it will benefit smaller parties that are able to pass the threshold.34 Neither of these 
observations results in benefits for the NDP. Rather, the benefits will be reaped by the 
major party whose past electoral performance will prove advantageous and smaller 
parties such as the Greens who received very little from corporate and union donations 
prior to the ban in Bill C-24, as can be seen in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Business and Trade Union Donations received by Political Parties in 2000 and 
2003 
Parties Business and Trade Union Donations in $ 
 2000 2003 
Canadian Reform Conservative 
Alliance 
6,615,589 1,319,144 
Progressive Conservative Party of 
Canada 
2,601,337 1,155,746 
Liberal Party of Canada 11,650,681 10,816,396 
New Democratic Party of Canada 2,755,499 5,308,675 
Green Party of Canada 0 63,300 
Source: Elections Canada. Total Election Contributions by Registered Political Party – 2000, 2003 
Young et al. also note that the NDP has not benefited as substantially as the other parties 
in non-election years and ‚may come to experience a competitive disadvantage in the 
long term‛.35 
The data from Table 3.3 show over the four fiscal years of 2004, 2005, 2006, and 
2007, the NDP received fewer contributions measured in dollars, than both the Liberals 
and Conservatives with the exception of 2004, where the party received more than the 
                                                 
34Lisa Young, Anthony Sayers, and Harold Jansen ‚Altering the Political Landscape: State Funding and 
Party Finance‛ in Canadian Parties in Transition¸eds. Alain-G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay. 
(Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2007), 342 
35 Young, Sayers and Jansen, 342 
34 
 
Liberals. While this is no fault of the finance system, it shows that the NDP is already 
receiving fewer dollar amounts from individual contributions causing the addition of 
unequal public dollars to aggravate a pre-existing problem.  
Table 3.3: Contributions from Individuals to Political Parties 2004-2007 
 Conservative Party of 
Canada 
Liberal Party of 
Canada 
New Democratic Party 
2004 $10,910,320.00 $4,719,387.52 $5,194,170.37 
2005 $17,847,451.00 $8,344,162.25 $5,120,826.74 
2006 $18,641,305.92 $9,063,126.36 $3,972,762.57 
2007 $16,983,629.73 $4,471,903.46 $3,959,451.24 
Source: Elections Canada. Registered Party Financial Transaction Returns 
 
Another major problem with the public money provided in the finance system is 
that it does not become available to parties until after the election. This makes it difficult 
for the NDP, further contributing to the affects of the finance system on the third party 
curse. This happens because the party will have more trouble raising the funds to run 
the campaign initially than will their major party counterparts, as the party has 
consistently received a lesser total of contribution dollars than the two major parties. 
What this means is that with less money to begin the campaign with, a third party will 
be in a disadvantageous position because public funds are not provided to parties until 
after the election. 
When the Canada Elections Act was amended in 2004, Parliament also changed the 
Income Tax Act to allow an increase in income tax credits for political contributions by an 
individual. The new rules were as follows:  
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 Contributions up to $400 receive a credit of 75% (Example: a contribution 
of $100 receives an income tax credit of $75) 
 Contributions between $400.01 and $750 receive a credit of $300 plus 50% 
of the amount over 400. (Example: a contribution of $750 receives an 
income tax credit of $475) 
 Contributions that are over $750.01 receive the lesser of $650 or $475 plus 
33.5% of the amount over $750 (Example: a contribution of $1275 receives 
an income tax credit of $650)36 
These new rules mean that the state is reimbursing a large portion of political 
contributions from citizens. However, a look at Table 3.4 reveals that of the electoral 
districts represented by the three main parties after the 39th general election, those 
represented by the NDP have the lowest average family income.  Both NDP and 
Conservative ridings fall below the national average by $4, 519.30 and $655.65 
respectively. It is clear from these results that the areas with the highest electoral 
support for the NDP, as based on a first-past-the-post system, are also on average lower 
income ridings than those represented by the other parties. Table 3.3 shows the NDP 
receives the smallest dollar amount of individual contributions of the three parties. A 
system that provides government reimbursement to citizens who make political 
donations, means that Canada’s third party, which has support among low-income 
families, and receives the smallest dollar amount of contributions may still not benefit as 
much from the tax benefit as the other parties do. This is further confirmation of the 
third party curse because, while the tax credit is certainly significant for a low income 
                                                 
36 Income Tax Act. Department of Justice. <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/I-3.3//20080617/en> 
at <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/index.html>     
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earner, if they are unable to part with the money upfront the reimbursement is 
meaningless.  
Table 3.4: Average Family Income for Electoral Districts in the 39th Parliament 
Electoral District Distribution Average Family Income  
based on 2001 census ($) 
NDP Ridings 61,640.70 
Liberal Ridings 69,554.85 
Conservative Ridings 65,504.35 
National Average 66,160.00 
Source: Canadian Census 2006.37  Statistics Canada.  
Detailed information available in Appendix I, II, and III 
 
Prior to Bill C-24 many candidate and party expenses were not included in the 
definition of ‚election expenses‛ used by Elections Canada and thus were exempt from 
spending limits. While the reforms broadened the definition of expenses, they still failed 
to address the fact that the spending limits definition only includes party spending 
during the thirty-six day election period,38 thereby allowing bigger, wealthier parties to 
spend more ahead of the election period than the 36 day limit allows. Young et al. also 
note that parties find ‚ways of circumventing the law, most notably by spending one 
election-type activities during the weeks leading up to the election campaign itself‛.39 
According to financial statements filed with Elections Canada, for the 2006 calendar 
                                                 
37 Census 2006. Statistics Canada.  Federal Electoral District Profile. 
<http://www.census2006.ca/english/census01/products/standard/fedprofile/SelectFED.cfm?R=FED03> at 
<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census/index.cfm>  
38 Bill C-24 An Act to Amend Canada’s Election Act and Income Tax Act. 
39 Young, Sayers and Jansen, 339 
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year, the NDP had a total expenditure of $14,245,37, while the Liberals had one of 
$31,338,866 and the Conservatives $30,032,841.40 The difference in monetary resources 
and expenditures revealed in these reports is staggering. The omission of an ongoing 
spending limit in finance provisions contributes to the affect of finance laws on the third 
party curse, and why it is expected to result in negative consequences for a third party.  
A look at party spending over the two most recent general elections reveals that 
the Liberals and Conservatives came within $989,397 and $300,669 respectively from the 
election expenses limit set out in the Canada Elections Act during the 2006 general 
election and $1,000,000 and $300 000 respectively in the 2004 general election (Table 3.5). 
When election time is imminent parties begin campaigning, they need not wait until the 
official call of an election to do so. Since funds spent outside of an election period are not 
included in the election expenses limit, wealthy parties have a large incentive to spend 
prior to the drop of the writ. It is necessary for the spending limit  to be specifically 
defined to include all election expenses incurred outside of the election period, in order 
to create a fairer playing field and prevent wealthy parties from outspending others. A 
third party does not have the funds the major parties do and would benefit from a 
ceiling on election spending. The current lack of regulation on when these funds are 
spent is unfavourable for a third party through a loophole which allows wealthy parties 
to spend considerably more on election outside of the 36 day time frame. This 
                                                 
40 Elections Canada. Registered Party Financial Transaction Returns. 
<http://www.elections.ca/scripts/webpep/fin/welcome.aspx?entity=6&lang=e> at <http://www.elections.ca>  
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contributes to the third party curse by exaggerating the financial disparities between the 
parties, and their ability to communicate their messages to the general public. 
This evaluation of the finance system reveals considerable financial inequities 
between the parties. However the effect that they have on the third party curse is not as 
apparent as expected. While the finance system seems to work in favour of the 










2004 General Election 
Number of Candidates 308 308 308 75 
Total Election 
Expenses 




309, 668.41 989, 397.32 5, 574, 994. 07 13, 086, 394. 20 
2006 General Election 
Number of Candidates 308 308 308 75 
Total Election 
Expenses 




259, 099.36 838, 588.64 4, 807, 411.72 13, 748, 873.67  
 
Source:  Elections Canada.  Total Election Expenses and Reimbursement, by Registered Political Party 
– 2004 General Election, and Total Election Expenses and Reimbursement, by Registered Political 
Party – 2006 General Election. 
 
pre-established major parties which causes a financial imbalance for a third party, its 
effect is not quite as strong as the previously discussed factor of the electoral system. 
Certain provisions create biased effects in favour of major parties such as the lack of 
regulation on the spending limit period and the fact that public funds are not provided 
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to parties until after the election help to create a situation whereby a third party benefits 
the least from the current public financing provisions. While provisions within the 
finance system are contributing to the disadvantage a third party faces in electoral 
politics in Canada, the link is not as strong as expected, nor is it as strong as the link 
























Voter Behaviour and Voter Turnout in Canada 
 
When universal male suffrage began to be adopted at the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th century, political analysts assumed that the better educated and 
wealthy would not bother to vote based on rational choice, and that the less educated 
would turn up in higher numbers to cast a ballot.41 Essentially, it was thought that those 
with a higher education would decide it not worthwhile to cast a vote which rationally 
will not be worth much in the pool of votes generated by a great crowd. But empirical 
studies soon began to show that socioeconomic status and voting were positively not 
negatively linked.42 As it turned out, research showed that those of low socioeconomic 
status vote in fewer numbers than those of high socioeconomic status. This chapter will 
evaluate the implications of low socioeconomic status on the rate of voter turnout in 
Canada, as well as the group of citizens that make up non-voters, and what these both 
suggest for the electoral success of the NDP and the third party curse. If these factors do 
in fact contribute to the third party curse one would expect that the groups of citizens 
who comprise non-voters negatively affect the electoral success of a third party. As 
turnout declines, one would also expect to see the rate of success for the party decrease 
as well. 
                                                 
41 Arend Lijphart. ‚Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma‛  The American Political 
Science Review (Vol. 91 No.1, 1997), 1 
42 Lijphart, 1 
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In countries where turnout is high the link between socioeconomic status and 
turnout tends to be less strong suggesting the demographics of the voting population 
are similar to those of the general population.43 The original expectation of the link 
between socioeconomic status and voting, by some analysts in the early 20th century, 
was wrong, and the opposite has actually occurred. In Canada, low voter turnout means 
that the groups most likely to vote for the NDP make up a large proportion of the non-
voters in the country. Indeed, as turnout increases, voter support for the NDP does as 
well. What this means is that without an increase in both voter turnout and political 
knowledge, it is likely that the NDP will continue to be trapped in the third party curse.  
Indeed, Lijphart's extensive review concluded that low voter turnout is a serious 
democratic problem because it means a turnout that is systematically biased against less 
well-to-do citizens and unequal turnout (that is, those with higher socioeconomic status 
turn out to vote in higher numbers than those with a lower socioeconomic status) spells 
unequal political influence.44 He stated ‚In countries with higher turnout, as expected, 
the link between socioeconomic status and turnout tends to be less strong, often not 
strong enough to be statistically significant, and sometimes negative.‛45  This indicates 
that when turnout increases, the demographics of voters become more representative of 
the population as a whole. Thus, those with low socioeconomic status vote in higher 
                                                 
43 Benjamin Radcliff, ‚Turnout and the Democratic Vote‛American Politics Research Vol.22. 1994 and, Harvey 
Tucker, Arnold Vedlitz and James DeNardo, ‚Does Heavy turnout Help Democrats in Presidential 
Elections?‛ American Political Science Review. Vol 80 No.4, 1986 
44 Lijphart 1997 
45 Lijphart, 3 
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numbers in a high turnout election, compared to a low turnout election. But why is this 
a problem for the NDP and how does it contribute to the third party curse?  
In order to determine how low voter turnout contributes to the NDP’s position in 
the third party curse, it is necessary to answer two questions: Is it a problem that a 
person does not vote? And is it a problem if many people do not vote? The answer to 
the first question is ‚no‛. Voting is a right, and it is well within one’s right to exercise a 
decision not to vote. The problem occurs when many people choose to do the same. 
Thus, the answer to the second question is ‚yes‛. When many people do not vote, we 
risk having those who do not be an accurate representation of the citizenry as a whole. 
Non-voting is not a neutral phenomenon. The results of a high turnout election and low 
turnout election differ in terms of the electoral results for a third party such as the NDP. 
When voter turnout falls to 64%, how do we know that the 64% of the population that 
turns out to vote is representative of the population as a whole? The answer is that we 
do not know.   
If voter turnout fell to 10%, how would the demographics of voters look?  Unless 
the distribution of voters in that 10% is spread equally across social classes, then the 
voting population becomes less and less representative of the population as a whole; as 
Lijphart’s study concluded, low turnout is biased against less well to do citizens. Voters 
thus become a poor representation of the citizenry and, as a result governments become 
an increasingly poorer reflection of the population. As previously stated the 
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conventional model predicts that the decline in turnout is unlikely to be uniform across 
all social categories. It is expected to be accompanied by a widening disparity in 
participation between the ‚haves‛ and ‚have nots‛.  Essentially, those who do not vote 
are largely members of a lower socioeconomic status. The result is that those who do not 
vote are not, figuratively speaking, represented in Parliament. As the lower income 
group is a large base of support for the NDP (which will be demonstrated below), the 
absence of those votes contributes to the argument that trends in voter behaviour help to 
explain the third party curse. 
A study of the 2000 election by Nevitte et al. supports the claim that income is an 
important determinant of turnout. They found that the higher one’s income is, the 
greater the propensity to vote.46 The resulting problem is that if the less affluent perceive 
the political system to be unresponsive to their needs, then the lack of voter turnout 
from this social group will reinforce the reasons why they are not voting to begin with. 
What this means is that voters who are among the lower socioeconomic class will 
perceive the system as inapplicable and unresponsive to the concerns in their daily lives 
which encourages them to continue to refrain from voting as they believe the 
government is uninterested in helping them.  What follows from Lijphart and Nevitte et 
al.’s conclusions that low voter turnout is biased against those of a low socioeconomic 
status, is that, in Canada, low voter turnout is biased against a left wing third party, 
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which in the Canadian context is the NDP.  This is so because those not voting are also 
typically those who would vote for the NDP, as is demonstrated by Table 4.1 which 
shows that the ridings in which the NDP received the greatest proportions of electoral 
support are among the least wealthy in the country. 
Table 4.1: Average Family Income based on Electoral District Distribution by Party  
Electoral District Distribution Average Family Income  
based on 2001 census ($) 
NDP Electoral Districts 61,640.70 
Liberal Electoral Districts 69,554.85 
Conservative Electoral Districts 65,504.35 
National Average 66,160.00 
Source: Canadian Census 2006.47  Statistics Canada.  
Detailed information available in Appendix I, II, and III 
 
The proportion of non-voters is expected to increase among groups such as 
young people, immigrants, tenants and the poor. These groups are ones that are already 
less socially and economically well off than those who are voting.48 These groups of non-
voters also tend to be the typical supporters of Canada’s third party, as the NDP is most 
likely to attract lower class citizens who are less well off. In Whatever happened to the 
NDP? by Nevitte et al., data from the 2000 Canadian Election Study is used to confirm 
support for the well-known social bases of the NDP. The study was conducted by the 
Institute for Social Research at York University in Toronto, and Jolicoeur in Quebec. 
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Three thousand six hundred and thirty one 30-minute interviews were conducted and 
the response rate was 60%.49 The study found that the conventional social groups where 
support for the NDP is more likely to be found are the unemployed, public sector 
workers, those in lower income groups, union members, and those with very high levels 
of formal education.50 The party also attempts to appeal to the working class by 
promoting itself as the only party to put working class families first.51 The NDP slogan 
for the federal election in October 2008 promoted the party as one that will ‚act on the 
priorities of the kitchen table, not just the boardroom table.‛52 Such statements reiterate 
which social groups the party seeks to represent and gain support from. When one or 
more of the conventional social groups of which the NDP typically receives support, 
participates at much lower levels than the general population, the party experiences a 
lower level of voter support than it otherwise may have received. The result of this 
phenomenon means a lower level of electoral representation for the NDP in Parliament, 
which further supports the claim that voter behaviour contributes to the third party 
curse.  
An evaluation of the 2000, 2004, and 2006 elections reveal similar results. In the 
2000 election, in the 301 electoral districts where the NDP ran a candidate, voter support 
for the party fluctuated in sync with increases and decreases in the rate of voter turnout 
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an average of 71.43% of the time. The percentage of voter turnout was compared for 
each electoral district for the 1997 and 2000 federal elections. Then, the percentage of 
votes received for the NDP candidate in each electoral district was compared between 
the two elections. Findings show, that as voter turnout increased, so too did vote 
percentage for the NDP, and likewise, as voter turnout decreased, so too did the 
percentage of votes for the NDP. This was especially true of electoral ridings in Ontario 
where this pattern occurred 94.17% of the time in the 103 electoral districts. As well, a 
look at the 11 new electoral districts won by the NDP in 2006 (i.e. electoral districts they 
did not win in the 2004 election, but did in 2006) reveals that voter turnout increased in 
9 of the 11 electoral districts. Similarly, of the 7 seats the Conservatives lost to another 
party in the 2006 election (i.e. electoral districts they had won in 2004, but did not win in 
2006), 6 of those districts had an increase in voter turnout. Thus, in new NDP victory 
districts, voter turnout increased and in districts where the Conservatives suffered a 
loss, turnout had also increased.  
This supports the conventional theory that higher turnout increases the 
propensity of lower socioeconomic status citizens to vote which increases the electoral 
success rate of the NDP. In fact, in nearly 79% of electoral districts where turnout 
increased from 2004 to 2006, so too did the vote percentage for the NDP.  Similarly, in 
80% of electoral districts where voter turnout decreased between 2004 and 2006, the vote 
percentage for the Conservative candidate increased.  Lower voter turnout fosters 
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higher support for the Conservative party as a right wing party; as those of higher 
socioeconomic status go the polls in higher numbers than those of a lower 
socioeconomic status which would typically support the NDP.  Thus, low voter turnout 
by imposing negative consequences on a third party provides further evidence that civic 
engagement affects the strength of the third party curse and the NDP’s position as a 
third party, whereas an increase in voter turnout will lessen the effect that voter turnout 
rates have on the third party curse. Zipp and Smith also conducted an analysis that 
indicated that class is related to voting, and the viability of the NDP. They also found 
that non-voting increases among the working classes in constituencies that are not 
winnable for the NDP, and decreases in those where the NDP is viable. 53 Additionally, 
Lawrence LeDuc using data from the 2004 Canadian Election Study showed that 
although party identification and ideology in the Canadian electorate may be declining, 
rhe NDP is still viewed as a party on the left, with 50.8% of NDP supporters clearly 
identifying themselves as firmly on the political left. 31.2% identified with the centre, 
and only 10.6% per cent of NDP supporters identified themselves as right on the 
political spectrum.54 
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Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff find that lower-status citizens or 
‘peripheral’ voters, who are the natural constituency of left parties, tend to vote at lower 
and more inconsistent rates than the higher status, ‘core’ voters, supporters of center of 
right parties.55 Therefore, if voter turnout were to increase in Canada, the proportion of 
lower status individuals who vote is likely to become more comparable to the 
proportion of higher status individuals who vote. This would likely result in higher 
levels of electoral support for the NDP as the increase in turnout would bring a larger 
share of the socio-economically disadvantaged to the polls, which increases the 
prospects for parties of the left. This view is also supported by research conducted 
within the United States56 and across several other countries.57 Benjamin Radcliff 
concluded in 1994 that the Democratic vote in the United States will increase with the 
rate of turnout.58 He confirms what the conventional model predicts: that Democratic 
identifiers tend to vote at lower rates than Republican identifiers. One reason for this 
situation is that the base demographic groups for Democratic supporters are blacks and 
the poor, who tend to vote less than middle-class whites, who form the Republican base. 
Any significant increases in turnout would almost certainly mean that these citizens 
would make up a greater share of voters and the Democrats could expect to profit from 
a higher turnout. The results of this trend in turnout is not simply limited to a specific 
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instance but rather can be generalized to any left wing third party as the trend has also 
been shown to exist in other countries. Radcliff and Pacek’s cross-national analysis 
found that the electoral fate of the left is determined by the rate of turnout.59 They found 
that the magnitude of this relationship was dependent on the degree to which these 
parties do in fact depend on the votes of lower socioeconomic status citizens.  These 
studies provide further strength to the claim that the patterns of civic engagement in 
Canada affect the success of a third party. The results of a study done by André Blais, 
Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte in 2002 show that income is an 
important determinant of turnout, as the higher people’s income, the greater their 
propensity to vote. They cite that this is an association that turns up regularly in cross 
national studies of turnout.60  
This is not surprising. The more preoccupied people are with 
providing for their basic needs, the less time and energy they 
have to pay attention to politics< The more affluent, in 
contrast, have both the resources and the perceived stake to get 
involved politically.61 
 
Martinez and Gill conducted an evaluation of the 1997 Canadian federal election 
based on the relationship between electoral turnout and partisan choice. 62 Their findings 
                                                 
59 Pacek and Radcliff (1995) 
60André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte, ‚Generational Change and the Decline 
of Political Participation : The case of Voter Turnout in Canada‛ a paper prepared for presentation at the 
workshop Citizenship on Trial: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Political Socialization of Adolescents (McGill 
University, Montreal, June 20-21, 2002) 
61 Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau and Nevitte, 2002 
62 Michael D. Martinez and Jeff Gill, ‚Does Turnout Decline Matter? Electoral Turnout and Partisan Choice 
in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election‛ The Canadian Journal of Political Science. (Vol. 39, No.2  June 2006) 
50 
 
were as the conventional model predicts: the right wing Reform party 63 suffered from a 
higher turnout, and the NDP, the leftist party, benefited from a higher turnout. Their 
analysis set out to discover whether higher turnout elections bring a larger share of the 
socio-economically disadvantaged to the polls, thereby increasing the prospects of 
parties of the left.64  They state that the relationship between turnout and partisan 
outcomes can be understood through the lens of generational politics,65 as the decline in 
turnout rates in Canada have been largely the result of especially low rates of 
participation among the young. The analysis conducted of the 1997 Canadian case 
provides evidence of what Martinez and Gill say is an emerging consensus, that the 
relationship between turnout and partisan outcomes is context dependent.66 While 
previous research has shown that the parties of the left usually benefit from higher 
turnout when the party system is defined by class, the outcomes are less consistent 
when the class cleavage is overcome by other social cleavages,67 such as was the case in 
Canada in 1997. 
The results confirm much of what the conventional model predicts that support 
for the NDP increases as turnout increases however the correlation was not as strong as 
predicted. They found that if turnout was about half of the actual rate, the estimated 
support level for the NDP would have gone down about one percentage point. If 
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turnout had been about 15 per cent higher, NDP support would have increased about a 
half of a percentage.68 They found that low turnout elections disproportionately attract 
older voters who were the most sympathetic to the right-wing Reform and high turnout 
elections bring in younger voters who were the least sympathetic to the Reform party.    
Given that the party system of the time was new, it offered unique circumstances 
to voters and created a new generational divide over the new party system. The 1997 
election served to reinforce the new system that emerged in 1993, which witnessed the 
collapse of the national party system that had been established several decades prior. 
The Liberal-Conservative-NDP hegemony cracked in 1993, and the old party system had 
been destroyed. Voters found themselves with more parties and candidates to choose 
from. These new choices also produced a greater regionalization of party competition. 
However, more than a decade later, the Canadian party system appears to have settled 
back into a predictable pattern where the prospect of future elections repeating the 
patterns of the divisions of the previous is high.  These circumstances make the 
atmosphere of the 1997 election unique in the Canadian perspective. Thus the results of 
Martinez and Gill’s study may not be easily applicable to future elections, and therefore 
not the best indicator of how the rate of voter turnout usually effects the rate of electoral 
success for a third party. Despite the dominating social cleavages however, the 
conventional theory of trends in voter turnout, which is also supported by this thesis, is 
still present, however on a less significant level.  
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Echoing Lijphart’s observations relating to class bias in turnout, in low turnout 
elections disproportionate numbers of the less educated, less wealthy, and those holding 
less prestigious occupations will abstain from voting. This leaves the election to be 
decided by a relatively better educated and wealthier electorate which is presumably 
more sympathetic to conservative parties. As the trend of the upper class voting in 
higher proportions than the lower class continues, the effects this creates will have a 
negative impact on the electoral success of the NDP and will continue to make up a 
significant branch of the third party curse.  
There is plenty of research to show that the young are not turning out to vote. 
The young are a strong base of support for the NDP, and therefore this trend is very 
disconcerting to NDP supporters. Gidengil et al. in 2004 found that  
when asked during the final ten days of the campaign how 
likely they were to vote in the upcoming election respondents 
in their twenties were much less likely to say that they were 
certain to vote. The likelihood of voting increased by about ten 
percentage points for those in their thirties, and another ten 
points for those in their forties, and a further ten points for 
those in their fifties, before levelling off for those in their 
sixties.69 
As their analysis showed, the most important point to grasp about the decline in 
participation since 1988 is that turnout has not declined in the electorate at large, but 
mostly among those born after 1970.  
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The results of a survey done by Jon Pammett and Lawrence LeDuc show that the 
decline in voter turnout in Canada can be attributed mainly to the young.70 Pammett 
hypothesizes that young people may not be participating in conventional political 
activities because meaningful participative opportunities are lacking. It may be that the 
young are not taught about politics in such a way to encourage participation. Recent 
research also points to very sizable gaps between the young and the old and their 
knowledge of basic facts relating to Canadian politics.  This suggests a diminished 
understanding and capacity to participate on the part of younger Canadians. In 2002, 
André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte concluded in their 
study 71 that: 
They [the young] are less interested in electoral politics than 
their elders are and they are less well informed. And it is not 
clear at this point that they are turning to other forms of 
political involvement instead. 
They go on to say that  
the problem seems to be one of disengagement rather than 
active discontent. The challenge, then, is to find ways of 
engaging young Canadians.72 
 
Additionally the Canada Election Studies Team reported in 2004 that, 
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Seventy-five per cent of our respondents strongly agreed that 
‘It is every citizen’s duty to vote in federal elections’ and 32 per 
cent said that they’d feel very guilty if they didn’t vote in a 
federal election. . . However, young Canadians are much less 
likely to share these sentiments: only 55 per cent strongly 
agreed with the statement about duty and only 18 per cent said 
that not voting would make them feel very guilty.73 
 
As previously established, the young constitute a strong base of support for the 
NDP. Thus, the results of the research by Pammett and Blais et al. (both of which 
provide evidence to the claim that the young are not voting in high numbers) show how 
voting behaviour of the young contributes to the third party curse as a reason why the 
NDP has remained in third party status. Additionally, research conducted by Nicole 
Goodman at Carleton University on the 2004 Canadian federal election found a strong 
correlation between young people’s feelings toward parties and their tendency to vote.74 
Youth who regard parties favourably are more likely to vote than those who perceive 
parties negatively. The findings showed that youth who perceive the NDP in a positive 
light are the same individuals with an above average sense of civic duty and political 
interest: ‚young Canadians who value participation and possess a better understanding 
of the political process have a greater likelihood of voting for the NDP‛.75 
                                                 
73 Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Joanna Everitt, Patrick Fournier, and Neil Nevitte. 2004. ‚Why Johnny 
Won’t Vote.‛ The Globe and Mail, August 4. 
74 Nicole Goodman. ‚An attitudinal explanation of low youth voter turnout in the 2004 Canadian federal 
election‛ Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science 





Likewise, Paul Howe’s comparison of Canadian and Dutch voting rates and 
patterns suggests that a reason for the heightened effects of knowledge on participation 
among the young is due to the lack of traditional stimuli for voting.76 The lack of a sense 
of civic duty, attachments to political parties or religious involvement, makes young 
Canadians more sensitive than their elders to knowledge considerations in deciding 
whether or not to vote. His research found that while young people in the Netherlands 
were equally indifferent about these traditional stimuli, knowledge is not as important a 
determinant of electoral participation among the young Dutch.  
So why are young Canadians affected by this? Consistent with Milner’s77 
characterization of high and low civic literacy societies, the Dutch remain on the whole 
more knowledgeable about politics than Canadians, and continue to participate at much 
higher levels. What civic literacy defines is the knowledge of how to actively participate 
and initiate change in one’s community. It also encompasses a knowledge and 
understanding of the basic principles of government and the functions necessary for a 
successful society.  While both countries have seen a widening gap between the 
knowledge of the young and the old, and both also experienced broader cultural 
changes likely to lead the young to abstain from voting, it is only in Canada (the low-
civic literacy country) that the political knowledge of the young has fallen to 
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dangerously low levels. The connection to be drawn here is that a greater political 
knowledge among the young results in greater political participation. Howe suggests 
that more attention should be given to the relationship between knowledge and 
participation across generations.78 This suggests that the trend can be reversed and with 
a greater focus on political knowledge and participation the negative effects of low voter 
turnout on the third party curse can be overcome. Thus, it would seem that the external 
factor of civic engagement that constitutes a branch of the third party curse is not a 
necessary condition of any democratic society and is susceptible to change.  
It is no secret that younger generations are generally more left leaning and 
research also shows that the young are voting in low numbers.  This view that the 
young are generally left leaning is supported by a 2007 survey conducted by the New 
York Times/CBS News/MTV on the opinions of young Americans age 17 to 29 years old. 
The survey was conducted through telephone interviews with 659 people throughout 
the United States. The results were weighted to adjust for variation in the sample 
relating to geographic region, sex, marital status, age and education. Given that 
American popular culture is so embedded in Canada, and that the social experiences of 
Canadians and Americans are largely similar as they experience North American 
culture in a western democracy, the results of this survey can be generalized to 
Canadians as well. The results show that young Americans appear to lean more to the 
left than the general population: 28 percent described themselves as liberal, compared 
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with 20 percent of the nation at large, and 27 percent called themselves conservative, 
compared with 32 percent of the general public.79 The young are more socially 
progressive and interested in new ideas and policies – they are interested in issues that 
matter to them such as the environment, the welfare state, education, health care and 
less interested in matters relating to the economy and taxation. Sixty-two percent said 
they would support a universal, government-sponsored national health care insurance 
program, while only 47 percent of the general population holds that view. Thirty 
percent agreed ‚Americans should always welcome new immigrants‛ whereas 24 
percent of the general public agreed. Forty-four percent said they believed that same-sex 
couples should be permitted to get married, compared with 28 percent of the general 
public. The survey also found that they are more likely than their elders to support the 
legalization of small amounts of marijuana.80  These findings provide further support for 
the view that the young are a strong base of support for the NDP in Canada as the party 
is left leaning and more progressive than the others. This suggests that the lack of 
political participation by younger Canadians contributes to the third party curse. 
As demonstrated earlier, the young are voting in a lower proportion than the rest 
of the population. What this means for the electoral success of the NDP and the third 
party curse, is that when voter turnout declines, the NDP loses a strong base of potential 
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voter support in the young. When the young are politically knowledgeable, they are 
more likely to turn out to vote, which results in higher voter support for the NDP. If this 
trend of poor political knowledge in the young continues, it will also continue to play a 
key role in the third party curse and will ensure that the NDP is stuck in third party 
status, unable to reach higher levels of electoral success. 
As described earlier, those with very high levels of formal education tend to be a 
base of support for the NDP. If this segment of the population is not politically aware, or 
enticed to go to the polls, the NDP could be losing a strong base of voter support. John 
Courtney, a political science professor at the University of Saskatchewan was quoted in 
a paper by CRIC as saying: 
At one time, the education system helped to provide a sense of 
civic responsibility and civic duty that encouraged people to 
get out and vote. But in my own teaching experience at various 
universities, I’ve seen a change that has impacted negatively on 
this 81 
 
Even the young who are among the most educated in the country are very likely to 
know the least about politics in Canada compared to other age groups, an idea that is 
supported by Courtney as well as other scholars, including Paul Howe who has said  
Young Canadians are the least politically knowledgeable group 
in the country, and by a wider margin today than ten years 
ago. 
Furthermore, 
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this relative decline in levels of political knowledge also holds 
true of young Canadians who have received a post secondary 
education 82  
 
It has been established that the young are generally left leaning, that they are not 
knowledgeable about the basic facts of Canadian politics, and that they are not turning 
out to vote. What does all of this mean for electoral support for the NDP? It is likely that 
the NDP is suffering from the consequences of the electorate’s lack of political 
knowledge, and certainly from the effects of low voter turnout. Mike d’Abramo, a 
research director who studies the trends in youth culture with Youthography, a Toronto 
based market research firm, told CTV News during the 2006 federal campaign that the 
NDP is the party with the most to gain by encouraging young people to vote.83 Who 
votes, and who does not, has important consequences for who will be elected and the 
policies they will pursue, thus, having an important impact on electoral results of the 
NDP and their position in party politics. 
A survey conducted by Pammet and LeDuc in a 2003 Canada Elections 
publication found that when asked whether people believed that ‚schools should do 
more to educate children in the benefits of voting and political participation‛ an 
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overwhelming majority of 83% voted ‚strongly agree‛ or ‚agree‛.84 Without aid from 
political institutions, such as the government itself, to encourage citizens to vote, the 
cleavage between voters and non-voters is likely to reinforce rather than mitigate the 
patterns of power and wealth associated with policy outcomes, community participation 
and lobbying. This will further reinforce reasons why non-voters are not voting, as 
government will continue to become less representative of non-voters. Declining 
turnout sows the seeds of increasing inequality among social groups both in terms of 
political participation and in terms of political influence. 
 Sixty years ago, V.O. Key wrote that ‚The blunt truth is that politicians and 
officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens 
that do not vote.‛85 It is no surprise then that governments pursue policies that are in 
accordance with the values and interests of their supporters. Therefore, as the rate of 
non-voters increases, political parties will tailor their messages to an ever-narrowing 
segment of the population: those who vote. As a result, policies become even less 
relevant to non-voters than before, reinforcing the notion that there is little point in 
voting. 
 The groups involved in this cycle are strong support bases for the NDP. Thus, as 
long as the cycle continues, what will result is that the key supporters of the NDP will 
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not participate in the voting process. The perpetuation of the cycle is the foundation of 
the role civic engagement plays in the third party curse. What this means is that the 
NDP will continue to struggle to persuade their supporters to vote as the outcomes of 




























In 1932, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation was founded. Its founders 
wanted a party that promoted universal cooperation for the common good. They 
believed capitalism was a source of inequality and greed and they wanted to make 
governments responsible for levelling out the economic playing field. In 1935, five CCF 
members were elected to Parliament, including Baptist Minister Tommy Douglas who in 
1944 went on to head the first nominally socialist government in North America as 
Premier of Saskatchewan. In 1961, the party aligned with the Canadian Labour Congress 
and formed the New Democratic Party of Canada, with Tommy Douglas elected leader. 
In the twenty three federal elections under the CCF/NDP banner, the party has never 
formed a federal government, or served as Official Opposition. The NDP is Canada’s 
third party.  The party has had six leaders, and holds the record for the largest 
percentage of women in a federal caucus in Canadian history. In 1988 the party formed 
its largest federal caucus with 43 members before quickly declining in subsequent years. 
In 2003, with the election of the current leader, Jack Layton, the party appeared to have 
renewed energy, and hopes for the party were, and still are, high. In the most recent 
federal election of October 2008, the party formed its second largest federal caucus with 
37 elected representatives. However, the party still remains in third party status. 
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While electoral support for the party has never reached heights even comparable 
to those of the major parties, it is important to consider what factors may be inhibiting 
the ability of the party to achieve success. Caught in what this thesis has defined as a 
third party curse, a situation that arises when a party cannot move forward to become a 
major party because of the discriminatory impact of external factors, the NDP has been 
and still is in a stalemate. Such factors may be either internal or external. This thesis has 
outlined three external factors that appear to be susceptible to change, as they are 
shaped by contemporary political choices. These factors are the electoral system, the 
party finance provisions in the Canada Elections Act and the trend towards low voter 
turnout. The NDP was chosen as the party for evaluation in this paper because of its 
history as Canada’s third party. Canada’s two major parties, that is, those parties which 
have the electoral strength to form government with regularity and when defeated 
typically form the Official Opposition, are the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. 
The NDP is Canada’s third party as it regularly ranks third in electoral support and does 
not have the electoral strength to form government. This is distinct from two other 
political parties in Canada, the Bloc Quebecois and the Green party, as regional and 
minor parties respectively.  The goal of the thesis was to determine if the three outlined 
factors were responsible in some way, for the lack of electoral success of the NDP, and 
thus contributors to the NDP’s position in the third party curse. 
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This research is significant in evaluating the future of the political party 
atmosphere in Canada. The Liberals and Conservatives have long dominated federal 
government in Canada, while the NDP has consistently followed in electoral support. 
Some important questions this research has provided a foundation for answering 
include whether the NDP is fated to third party status solely by reasons of internal party 
matters or whether there is something unique about the politics of Canada that maintain 
the party at this level.  If the NDP were to dissolve as a party would any new third party 
face the same challenges? What does this all mean for the future of party politics? 
The thesis approached the research question by considering three factors; the 
electoral system, the party finance system, and the trend towards lower voter turnout. 
By examining each of these factors separately, the goal was to determine if each 
independently of the others bore responsibility for the NDP’s position in the third party 
curse. Each factor was described and evaluated using data from previous elections. As 
well, information was provided as to how these factors could be changed to determine if 
in fact the negative effects of these factors could be reversed through reforms of the 
system, or changes in civic engagement in respect to the trend toward lower voter 
turnout. This is to ensure that the negative circumstances created by each of these 
factors are not inevitable but rather susceptible to change. The electoral system was 
evaluated and contrasted with aspects of a proportional representation system to 
determine if under an alternate system a third party would suffer the same electoral 
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consequences. The party finance provisions of the Canada Elections Act were evaluated to 
see if the effects were destructive to a third party and if the negative consequences 
brought about by the current finance system could be lessened by reforms to the finance 
provisions. Finally, the trend in low voter turnout was examined as well as the 
presentation of previous scholarly research that revealed the negative consequences the 
NDP suffers from low turnout and how they can be reversed when turnout increases.  
The first factor evaluated was the Single Member Plurality system. Canada’s 
first-past-the-post electoral system has consistently produced disproportionate seat 
distributions in Parliament.  While typically favouring the governing party or two major 
parties the system has heavily disadvantaged any third party or minor party by 
awarding it far fewer seats than its percentage of the vote would warrant. Chapter Two 
revealed the dramatic disproportions that have occurred under this system, and 
contrasted it to what could occur under a system of proportional representation. Of the 
twenty-three elections held since the CCF first ran federally in 1935, the NDP has 
received fewer seats than warranted by its popular support twenty-two times. At the 
same time, the governing party in each of those elections has been overcompensated in 
the House of Commons, than is warranted by actual percentage of popular support.  
A discussion of the process of strategic voting revealed that a third party is most 
likely to suffer the consequences of strategic voting as voters will want to place a vote 
for a party that stands a chance of winning over the party they wish to see defeated. This 
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is important in terms of electoral systems as Chapter Two provided a discussion of the 
work done by Gary W. Cox, which showed that strategic voting declines as the 
proportionality of the electoral system increases. Thus, the current first-past-the-post 
electoral system has debilitating affects on a third party that would not be inevitable 
under any electoral system. Likewise, a third party is punished for having widely 
distributed support across the country as it will not have enough concentrated support 
to reap the benefits of the first-past-the-post system, unlike a regional party which has 
the potential to be grossly over-represented. 
In Chapter Two, data from previous elections revealed what could have been for 
the NDP under a system of proportional representation. It showed that the presence of a 
third party would have been significantly greater if not for the first-past-the-post 
election system, with the potential to alter the very foundation of party politics in 
Canada. 
As Duverger noted in 1972, the first-past-the-post electoral system tends to 
‚pulverize third parties‛.86 Third parties are essentially permanent doormats in any 
plurality system.  A system of proportional representation can rectify this problem by 
providing a proportionate vote-to-seat ratio in Parliament, awarding each party the 
representation they have earned based on number of votes cast. It would prevent the 
governing party from being overrepresented and remaining parties from being 
                                                 
86 Duverger (1972), 23 
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underrepresented. It is clear that the first-past-the-post system does contribute to and 
help explain the effects of the third party curse. Reform of the current system to a more 
proportional system would relieve the negative consequences currently suffered by a 
third party and would eliminate the electoral system as a branch of the third party curse, 
as it is indeed susceptible to change. The research presented has shown that as long as 
Canada continues to run elections based on this system, it is unlikely that a third party 
will ever see the success its popular support entitles it to. The NDP has suffered 
consistent disproportions under the first-past-the-post system and will remain caught in 
a third party curse for as long as the FPTP system is in place.  
The second factor evaluated was Canada’s party finance laws. Finance provisions 
were evaluated which create a financial imbalance for a third party. While Chapter 
Three set out to determine whether party finance provisions negatively impact a third 
party, the results were not as expected. Certain provisions create biased effects in favour 
of major parties thereby creating unfavourable circumstances for a third party. Chapter 
Three shows that the ridings currently represented by the NDP have the lowest average 
income in the country, and that the party also consistently receives the smallest amount 
of individual contributions, making this scenario less likely to occur for the NDP than 
for the other two parties. 
Other provisions evaluated in Chapter Three such as the spending limit only 
within election periods, and the tax credit reimbursement do heavily favour the major 
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parties over a third party, however not to the extent expected. The fact that public funds 
are not provided to parties until after the election creates a situation whereby a third 
party suffers by not having large amounts of money available to them during the 
campaign.  
 There are however alternative systems of party financing such as one that is 
100% publicly funded which may serve to level the playing field much better for all 
parties involved. Equal funds for all parties would create a monetary parity and would 
allow the parties to compete on an equal basis. Chapter Three concluded that the NDP 
faces a disadvantage as a third party as a result of Canada’s finance laws at the federal 
level.  
 The final factor evaluated concentrated on civic engagement and the trend 
toward lower voter turnout in Canada. The last general election held in 2008 inspired 
only 59% of eligible voters to go to the polls.  With such a low voter turnout, it is almost 
certain that those who are voting are not an accurate representation of the demographics 
of the country.  Chapter Four showed how the drop in turnout is likely to be 
accompanied by a disparity between the participation of the ‚have‛ and the ‚have 
nots‛. This means there is an increasing degree of inequality in representation as those 
who do not vote, do not get representation. Canada’s third party has the least wealthy 
supporters of the three main parties, encompassing a large portion of low-
socioeconomic status citizens. Lijphart’s review of the consequences of unequal political 
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participation in 1997 concluded that low voter turnout is biased against less well to do 
citizens. Nevitte et al’s study in 2000 demonstrated that those of a low socioeconomic 
status are a strong social base of support for the NDP. 
Chapter Four clearly demonstrated that income is an important determinate of 
electoral turnout. Essentially, the higher one’s income is, the greater the propensity to 
vote, this was supported by a study done for this research of the 2000, 2004, and 2006 
Canadian Federal Elections. The study found that as voter turnout increased in 
individual ridings, so too did vote percentage for the NDP. 
 Many studies have also demonstrated that the left end of the political spectrum 
has the most to lose from a decline in turnout. The NDP is both a left wing party and is 
supported by low socioeconomic status voters; as a result, the party suffers from low 
voter turnout.  
Another key component of voter behaviour that was analyzed was the 
proportion of the young who are not turning up to vote. Studies by Milner and Howe 
demonstrate that the lack of civic engagement by the young is damaging to the electoral 
support of the NDP. By suggesting that a diminished understanding of the political 
process diminishes the capacity of younger Canadians to participate in politics, Chapter 
Four has shown that a greater emphases on civic literacy and the understanding of how 
the political process works would encourage more citizens to go to the polls. This would 
increase the electoral prospects of the NDP. 
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Without a greater understanding of how important each vote is, and how it 
translates to governmental representation the vicious cycle that affects those of lower 
socioeconomic status will continue to impact negatively on the electoral success of the 
NDP, as will the trend in the lack of civic engagement from the young. Proactive efforts 
are necessary to reverse the trend of turnout we have been experiencing over the last 
several decades so that election results will translate to a more accurate representation 
of the general population in Parliament. Voter behaviour and specifically the trend 
towards low voter turnout comprise a significant component of the third party curse. 
Only when the demographics of the country are accurately represented in Parliament, 
will the NDP have a chance to enjoy electoral success.  
Based on the findings of this research, the most important recommendation to be 
made is in support for reform of the current Single Member Plurality electoral system 
used in Canada. Under a system of proportional representation, support is better 
translated into electoral results, providing a more accurate representation of the desires 
of Canadians. Under a PR system, the NDP would receive the electoral recognition it 
has earned. The benefits of the system would be immediately apparent in the 
composition of the House of Commons. Without the constraints of the electoral rules 
under the FPTP system, a significant contributing factor to the third party curse would 
be removed. The factor of the electoral system and the benefits of its reform are 
considered the most important because an electoral system is the groundwork for which 
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all elections, electoral results, electoral provisions, and voter behaviour are based and 
determined. Reform of this system would have an unprecedented impact on the way in 
which elections are run and regulated in this country, and thus provides the basic 
framework for creating a political atmosphere more accepting of a third party, and less 
susceptible to the third party curse.  
The implications of this research are clear. The NDP is caught in a third party 
curse at least partially due to the negative consequences of the three factors evaluated in 
this thesis; the electoral system, the party finance provisions in the Canada Elections Act 
and the lack of civic engagement on behalf of the electorate. As long as these factors 
continue to exist, the NDP will remain trapped in the third party curse. Canada will 
remain a multi-party system where major, minor, third and regional parties all play a 
role, but will remain dominated by the two party politics of the Liberals and 
Conservatives.  
 It has not been the intention of this thesis to argue that the barriers presented 
here are the sole reasons why the NDP has never formed government at the federal level 
in Canada. Rather, its purpose has been to analyze factors that prevent a third party in 
Canada from seeing electoral success.  While it is possible that the reformation of these 
barriers alone will not lead to the NDP forming government, it is necessary for them to 




Appendix I: NDP Riding-Demographics 
 
Riding Province Average Family Income 
based on the 2001 census 
($) 
Toronto Danforth ON 67, 551 
Timmins James Bay ON 57, 284 
British Columbia Southern 
Interior 
BC 53, 725 
Vancouver Island North BC 57, 983 
Western Arctic NT 75, 102 
New Westminster Coquitlam  BC 68, 407 
Elmwood Transcona MB 54, 615 
Hamilton Mountain ON 63, 010 
Trinity Spadina ON 81, 415 
Hamilton Centre ON 52, 769 
Windsor Tecumseh ON 73, 341 
Nanaimo-Cowichan  BC 54, 877 
Skeena-Bulkley Valley  BC 60, 366 
Vancouver East BC 48, 184 
Ottawa Centre ON 84, 956 
Acadie-Banthurst NB 46, 400 
Burnaby-New Westminster BC 58, 734 
Hamilton East Stoney Creek ON 59, 120 
Winnipeg Centre MB 43, 152 
Sault Ste. Marie ON 58, 007 
Windsor West ON 66, 432 
London Fanshawe ON 58, 351 
Halifax NS 68, 901 
Outremont QC 68, 739 
Parkdale-High Park ON 76, 648 
Surrey North BC 50, 445 
Victoria BC 66, 327 
Burnaby-Douglas BC 63, 749 
Sackville-Eastern Shore NS 61, 584 
Winnipeg North MB 49, 047 
Total 1, 849, 221 









Appendix II: Conservative-Riding Demographics 
 
Riding Province Average Family Income 
based on the 2001 census 
($) 
Avalon NL 45, 589 
St. John’s East
87
 NL 66, 037 
St. John’s South – Mount 
Pearl 
NL 56, 999 
Central Nova NS 52, 911 
South Shore – St. Margaret’s  NS 52, 215 
Fundy Royal NB 55, 657 
New Brunswick Southwest
88
  NB 53, 276 
Tobique – Mactaquac NB 48, 650 
Beauce QC 52, 611 
Beauport – Limoilou
89
 QC 50, 722 
Charlesbourg – Haunte Saint 
Charles 
QC 58, 957 
Jonquiere – Alma QC 55, 640 
Levis – Bellechasse QC 54, 933 
Lotbiniere – Chutes de la 
Chaudiere 
QC 60, 827 
Louis Hebert QC 78, 541 
Louis Saint Laurent QC 60, 719 
Megantic L’Erable QC 48, 425 
Pontiac QC 58, 377 
Roberval – Lac Saint Jean
90
 QC 50, 249 
Ancaster – Dundas – 
Flamborough Westdale 
ON 89, 428 
Barrie ON 67, 380 
Bruce – Grey – Owen Sound ON 58, 270 
Burlington ON 89, 539 
Cambridge ON 72, 055 
Carleton – Mississippi Mills
91
 ON 102, 118 
Chatham – Kent – Essex  ON 65, 288 
Dufferin – Caledon  ON 87, 197 
Durham
92
 ON 78, 234 
Elgin – Middlesex – London  ON 67, 124 
Essex ON 84, 788 
                                                 
87 Formerly known as St. John’s North 
88 Formerly known as St. Croix-Belleisle 
89 Formerly known as Beauport 
90 Formerly known as Roberval 
91 Formerly known as Carleton-Lanark 
92 Formerly known as Clarington-Scugog-Uxbridge 
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Glengarry – Prescott – Russell  ON 66, 774 
Haldimand – Norfolk  ON 64, 026 
Haliburton – Kawartha Lakes 
– Brock 
ON 58, 691 
Kitchener – Conestoga  ON 72, 893 
Lambton – Kent – Middlesex  ON 66, 332 
Lanark – Frontenac – Lennox 
and Addington  
ON 60, 033 
Leeds – Grenville  ON 63, 473 
Mississauga – Streetsville
93
 ON n/a 
Nepean – Carleton  ON 94, 830 
Niagara Falls  ON 62, 620 
Niagara West – Glanbrook  ON 75, 830 
Northumberland – Quinte 
West 
ON 60, 840 
Oshawa ON 63, 855 
Ottawa – Orleans  ON 91, 698 
Ottawa West – Nepean  ON 76, 580 
Oxford  ON 66, 649 
Parry Sound – Muskoka  ON 55, 458 
Perth – Wellington  ON 67, 911 
Peterborough  ON 60, 921 
Prince Edward – Hastings  ON 56, 433 
Renfrew – Nipissing – 
Pembroke  
ON 57, 429 
Sarnia – Lambton  ON 68, 829 
Simcoe – Grey  ON 70, 172 
Simcoe North ON 61, 163 
St. Catharines  ON 62, 972 
Stormont – Dundas – South 
Glengarry 
ON 58, 053 
Thunder Bay – Superior 
North 
ON 68, 031 
Wellington – Halton Hills  ON 87, 580 
Whitby – Oshawa  ON 85, 439 
York – Simcoe  ON 72, 956 
Brandon – Souris  MB 53, 298 
Charleswood – St James – 
Assiniboia  
MB 73, 222 




MB 44, 261 
                                                 
93 This riding was not created until 2003 from parts of Brampton West-Mississauga and Mississauga West, 
therefore there is no information available from the 2001 census. For the purposes of this research, this 
riding will be left out of the analysis. 
94 Formerly known as Dauphin Swan River 
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Kildonan – St. Paul  MB 68, 349 
Portage – Lisgar  MB 53, 269 
Provencher  MB 55, 592 
Selkirk – Interlake  MB 56, 036 
Winnipeg South  MB 78, 012 
Battlefords – Lloydminster  SK 51, 938 
Blackstrap  SK 66, 892 
Cypress Hills – Grasslands  SK 54, 181 




SK 41, 513 
Palliser  SK 64, 416 
Prince Albert  SK 54, 554 
Regina – Lumsden – Lake 
Centre  
SK 63, 925 
Regina – Qu’Appelle  SK 49, 385 
Saskatoon – Humboldt  SK 65, 502 
Saskatoon – Rosetown – 
Biggar  
SK 47, 323 
Saskatoon – Wanuskewin  SK 61, 568 
Souris – Moose Mountain  SK 55, 884 
Yorkton – Melville  SK 48, 485 
Calgary – Nose Hill  AB 91, 212 
Calgary Centre
96
 AB 85, 530 
Calgary Centre-North
97
 AB 70, 223 
Calgary East  AB 56, 761 
Calgary Northeast  AB 59, 014 
Calgary Southeast  AB 95, 013 
Calgary Southwest AB 91, 529 
Calgary West  AB 98, 680 
Crowfoot  AB 62, 247 
Edmonton – Leduc  AB 89, 762 




AB 64, 497 
Edmonton – Sherwood Park  AB 75, 488 
Edmonton – Spruce Grove  AB 73, 878 
Edmonton – St. Albert  AB 74, 620 
Edmonton – Strathcona  AB 69, 415 
Edmonton Centre  AB 60, 581 
Edmonton East  AB 54, 450 
Fort McMurray – Athabasca
99
 AB 73, 831 
                                                 
95 Formerly known as Churchill River 
96 Formerly known as Calgary South Centre 
97 Formerly known as Calgary North Centre 
98 Formerly known as Edmonton Beaumont 
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Lethbridge  AB 60, 146 
Macleod  AB 76, 007 
Medicine Hat AB 61, 428 
Peace River  AB 64, 194 
Red Deer AB 67, 345 
Vegreville – Wainwright  AB 65, 787 
Westlock – St. Paul  AB 62, 082 
Westaskiwin  AB 58, 770 
Wild Rose AB 75, 868 
Yellowhead AB 63, 043 
Abbotsford BC 58, 719 
Cariboo – Prince George  BC 61, 816 
Chilliwack – Fraser Canyon  BC 55, 059 
Delta – Richmond East  BC 73, 861 
Fleetwood – Port Kells  BC 66, 830 




BC 59, 050 
Kelowna – Lake Country
101
 BC 60, 535 
Kootenay – Columbia  BC 57, 985 
Langley BC 71, 383 
Nanaimo – Alberni  BC 58, 654 
Okanagan – Coquihalla  BC 55, 985 
Okanagan – Shuswap
102
 BC 53, 932 




BC 64, 397 
Port Moody – Westwood – 
Port Coquitlam  
BC 71, 128 
Prince George – Peace River BC 65, 527 
Saanich Gulf Islands  BC 70, 814 
South Surrey – White Rock – 
Cloverdale  
BC 82, 915 
Vancouver Kingsway  BC 54, 724 
Total 8, 253, 547 





                                                                                                                                                       
99 Formerly known as Athabasca 
100 Formerly known as Kamloops Thompson 
101 Formerly known as Kelowna  
102 Formerly known as Okanagan Shuswap  
103 Formerly known as Dewdney – Alouette  
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Appendix III: Liberal-Riding Demographics 
 
 Riding  Province Average Family Income 
based on the 2001 census 
($) 
Mississauga-Erindale ON 89, 129 
Yukon YT 69, 564 
Mississauga-Brampton South ON 76, 153 
London West ON 75, 501 
Brampton West ON 70, 837 
Ottawa-Vanier ON 73, 095 
North Vancouver BC 84, 750 
St. Paul’s ON 130, 384 
Vaughn ON 89, 188 
Nickel Belt ON 60, 237 
Thunder Bay-Rainy River ON 64, 415 
Kings-Hants NS 50, 374 
Oakville ON 116, 565 
Humber-St.Barbe-Bair Verte NL 44, 805 
Scarborough Centre ON 56, 775 
Richmond BC 61, 489 
Bourassa QC 44, 494 
Mount Royal QC 83, 855 
Etobicoke North ON 53, 625 
Cape Breton-Canso NS 46, 599  
Medawaska-Restigouche NB 47, 326 
Newton-North Delta BC 63, 156 
Brampton-Springdale ON 79, 952 
Saint Laurent-Cartieville QC 61, 355 
Vancouver South BC 56, 540 
York Centre ON 64, 010 
Malpeque PE 55, 506 
Sydney-Victoria NS 44, 031 
Laval-Les Iles QC 68, 692 
Vancouver Centre BC 75, 756 
Don Valley West ON 136, 032 
Wascana SK 71, 382 
Missisauga East-Cooksville ON 63, 877 
Willowdale ON 81, 664  
Ajax-Pickering ON 83, 370 
Miramichi NB 46, 085 
Etobicoke-Lakeshore ON 82, 309 
Notre-Dame-de-Grace 
Lachine 
QC 62, 810 
Thornhill ON 102, 459 
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Nunavut NU 52, 624 
Scarborough-Agincourt ON 60, 742 
Churchill MB 48, 465 
Beausejour NB 49, 594 
Scarborough Rouge River ON 58, 426 
Cardigan PE 53. 056 
Bramalea Gore Malton ON 64, 831 
Welland ON 61, 498 
Sudbury ON 63, 886 
Esquimalt-Juan de Fuca BC 61, 140 
La Salle-Emard QC 52, 786 
Random-Burin-St. Georges NL 40, 863 
Markham-Unionville ON 81, 226 
Ottawa South  ON 76, 013 
Egmont PE 49, 333 
Scarborough-Guildwood ON 57, 272 
Pickering-Scarborough East ON 91, 184 
Kingston and the Islands ON 68, 494 
Beaches-East York ON 73, 372 
Moncton-Riverview-Dieppe NB 59, 095 
Charlottetown PE 58, 741 
Vancouver Quadra BC 112, 155 
Winnipeg South Centre  MB 80, 512 
Saint Leonard-Saint Michel QC 47, 994 
Pierrefonds-Dollar QC 75, 497 
London North Centre ON 71, 995 
Hull-Aylmer QC 67, 728 
Toronto Centre ON 124, 082 
Don Valley East ON 64, 085 
Kitchener Centre ON 64, 306 
Halifax West NS 71, 046 
Honore-Mercier QC 59, 788 
Nipissing-Timiskaming ON 59, 077 
Labrador NL 57, 227 
Dartmouth-Cole Harbour NS 60, 919 
Lac-Saint-Louis QC 94, 291 
Fredericton NB 61, 324 
York West ON 45, 924 
Davenport ON 53, 687 
Saint Boniface MB 64, 615 
Bonavista-Gander-Grand 
Falls-Windsor 
NL 42, 924 
Brant ON 64, 286 
Algoma-Manitoulin-
Kapuskasing 



















Huron Bruce ON 64, 499 
Newmarket Aurora ON 97, 216 
Mississauga South ON 95, 918 
Kitchener Waterloo ON 84, 077 
Oak Ridges Markham ON 100, 369 
West Nova NS 46, 316 
York South-Weston  ON 49, 873 
Halton ON 103, 617 
Kenora ON 60, 457 
Eglington-Lawrence ON 116, 715 
Scarborough Southwest ON 58, 866 
Richmond Hill ON 89, 329 
Etobicoke Centre ON 93, 277 
Saint John NB 57, 140 
Total 6, 677, 265 
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